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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

)
)

vs.

Case No. 15169

SALT LAKE COUNTY,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a claim for refund brought by the plaintiffrespondent, Kennecott Copper Corporation, against defendantappellant, Salt Lake County, to recover ad valorem property
taxes paid to Salt Lake County under protest for the year 1976.
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT
Plaintiff-respondent filed an alternative motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings or Summary Judgment with regard
to its First Cause of Action.
Defendant-appellant filed an alternative motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings or Summary Judgment with regard to
plaintiff's First and Second Causes of Action.

The Court

denied defendant's Motions and took plaintiff's alternative
Motion under advisement.

Plaintiff and defendant submitted
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legal memoranda to the Court.

The Court issued its memoranaur

decision granting plaintiff a Summary Judgment.

The trial

court ruled that Salt Lake County under the facts as

presem~,

was without legal authority to re-set its mill levy after
date prescribed by statute.

t~

By denying defendant's Motions,

the Court also ruled that the previous decision of the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah in Salt Lake City Corporation et.!!_
v. Salt Lake County, case no. 14776 decided October 7, 1977,
in which Kennecott Copper Corporation was a plaintiff and

S~t

Lake County the defendant, had no binding affect upon the
instant action and was not therefore res judicata.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-appellant seeks reversal of the judgment
of the trial court and further requests that this Court enter
an order determining:
( 1)

that defendant-appellant, Salt Lake County, had

the authority to adopt the mill levy as finally adopted and
subsequently approved by the State Tax Commission of Utah and
utilized for the year 1976; and
(2)

that the issues presented by the Complaint of

plaintiff-respondent, Kennecott Copper Corporation, have previou
been decided by the Supreme Court in Salt Lake City Corporatioo,
et al., v. Salt Lake County, case no. 14776, in which

Kennec~t

Copper Corporation appears as a named plaintiff, and that Kenne,:
Copper Corporation is therefore barred and precluded from
re-litigating the same issues in a subsequent case against the
same defendant.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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contain errors.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 9, 1976 the Salt Lake County Board of
Commissioners set the general Salt Lake County property tax
levy at 14.42 mills.
On September 20, 1976 the Salt Lake County Board
of Commissioners re-set the mill levy thereby adopting a
general property tax mill levy of 16 mills.

The 16 mill

levy was approved by the State Tax Commission of Utah.
On the 24th day of September, 1976, plaintiffrespondent Kennecott Copper Corporation, in conjunction
with other named plaintiffs, filed an original action in the
Utah Supreme Court against Salt Lake County entitled
"Petition and Motion for an Extraordinary Writ," Case
No. 14776.

(T-39-47)

Included in Count I of plaintiff-

respondent's petition were the following allegations:
"7. On May 28, 1976, this Court in the case of
Salt Lake City Corporation et al. v. Salt Lake
County et al., 550 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1976) determined that where a Utah County of the first
class decides to provede certain municipal
type services to unincorporated areas of that
county they must do so in accordance with
the terms of the Municipal Type Services to
Unincorporated Areas Act, Utah Code Annotated,
Section 17-34-1 et seq., 1953 as amended. A
copy of said decision is attached hereto as
Exhibit 'A' and by this reference made a part
hereof. Said decision states as follows:
'This is an equitable enabling statute permitting counties to provide equal services
to the unincorporated areas of the county.
But where the county elects to provide such
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services the statute says it is to defray the
costs by either one of two methods: (12 by
levying taxes on taxable property in the
unincorporated areas of the county receiving
the service; or (2) by imposign a service
charge pr fee to persons benefited by such
services.
Where the county chooses to follow the first
part of the statute (providing services) the
second part of the statute must be followed.
The extent by which the costs would be defrayed
by the two methods would of course depend
on all the cost thereof and all the surrounding
circumstances. To hold that the county may
provide services without attempting to collect
money to defray the cost would serve as an
unjust burden upon the city residents and be
contrary to the clear statutory language.'
Said decision remanded the aforesaid case to the
District Court 'with directions to enjoin the
furnishing of all municipal services (except
fire fighting services) to unincorporated areas
of the county until the respondents comply
with the provision of Section 17-34-1, U.C.A.
1953, Replacement Volume 2B'."
11

17. Respondents have continued providing
the services of street lighting, planning and
zoning, and garbage and refuse collection and
disposal to the unincorporated areas of the county
since the date of this Court's decision mandating
that such be discontinued until such time as
Salt Lake County complies with the terms of Utah
Code Annotated, Section 17-34-1 et seq., 1953
as amended."
"20. Respondents actions in continuing to provide
the aforesaid services without complying with
this Court's decision in Salt Lake City Corooration v. Salt Lake County, supra, and without
complying with the terms of Utah Code Annotated
Section 17-34-3, 1953 as amended, and in raising
the general mill levy on September 20, 1976, so
as to be able to continue to provide aforesaid
services with general fund revenues constitutes
a direct defiance, and blatant disregard, of
this Court and of the legislature of the State
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of Utah. Said actions are illegal, null and
void, ultra vires and without any legal authority."
Paragraphs 22, 23 and 24 of said petition alleged as
follows:
11
22.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-9-6.3,
59-9-8, 17-36-31, 1953, as amended, require
the Salt Lake County Board of County Commissioners
to set the mill levy for the tax year in question
on or before the second Monday in August. These provisions are as follows:

'The board of county commissioners of each
county must levy a tax on the taxable property
of the county between the last Monday ~n
the seventh month of each fiscal year and
the second Monday in the eighth month of each
fiscal year to provide funds for county purposes including but not limited to the
following:
(1) For general county purposes;
(2) For the care, maintenance and relief
of indigent sice and otherwise dependent poor;
(3) For the construction, improvement and
maintenance of county roads;
(4) For all other purposes authorized by law.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-5-6.3, 1953 as amended.
The governing body of each city and town,
and each board of county commissioners, must
file a statement with the state tax commission,
on or before the second Monday in August
of each year, showing the amount and purpose
of each levy fixed by such governing body and
board.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-9-8, 1953 as amended.
On or before the second Monday in August
of each year, the governing body shall levy
a tax on the taxable real property and
personal property within the county. In its
computation of the total levy subject to
sections 59-9-6.5, it shall determine the
requirements for each fund and specify the
number of mills apportioned to each fund.
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The proceeds of the tax apportioned for
purposes of the general fund shall be credited
in the general fund.
The proceeds of the tax apportioned for
utility and other special fund purposes shall
be credited to the appropriate accounts in
the utility or other special funds.'
Utah Code Annotated, Section 17-36-31, 1953 as amended."
"2 3. As above set forth in Salt Lake County
Commission on September 20, 1976, attempted
to reset the general property tax mill levy
applicable to all taxable real property in
Salt Lake County from 14.42 mills to 16 mills."
"24. The attempted resetting of the general
mill levy on September 20, 1976, after the
statutorily required setting on or before the
second Monday in August, is without legal
authority, null, void, ultra vires and without any force and effect."
Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of plaintiff-respondent's
Petition for Extraordinary Writ contained the following
request for relief:
"2. That such extraordinary Writ prohibit
Respondents from assessing, collecting or
proceeding to assess and collect 1.58 mills
of the general Salt Lake County property
tax mill levy; said 1.58 mills representing
the difference between the 16 mill levy set
by the Salt Lake County Board of Commissioners
on September 20, 1976 and the 14.42 mill
levy set by said Board on August 9, 19 76."
"3. That this Court declare the mill levy
of September 20, 1976, above set forth to
be illegal, ultra vires, accomplished without authority, beyond the purview of the law,
and of no force and effect."
"4. That Respondents be restrained, enjoined
and prohibited from assessing, collecting,
or proceeding any further to assess and
collect 1.58 mills of the general Salt Lake
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may
contain errors.
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County property tax mill levy pending a
hearing and that such restraint, injunction
and probhibition be made permanent upon hearing."
On October 7, 1976, this Court issued its written
decision in that case. (T-38)
Thereafter, on the 7th day of December, 1976,
Kennecott Copper Corporation, as plaintiff, filed a
Complaint against Salt Lake County in the District Court
of Salt Lake County. (T-2-16)
Plaintiff-respondent's Complaint including its
First and Second Causes of Action contains allegations
substantially the same as the allegations of the Petition for
Extraordinary Relief, decided by the Utah Supreme Court on
October 7, 1976, case No. 14776.

In the Petition for Extra-

ordinary Relief, plaintiff sought injunctive relief.

In

plaintiff's second lawsuit, plaintiff sought refund of taxes
paid under protest.

The legal and factual issues presented

by both actions are identical.

Defendant-appellant Salt Lake

County, in response to plaintiff-respondent's second lawsuit,
filed its Answer. (T-20-23)
Amo~

the affirmative defenses asserted by defendant-

respondent were the defenses of Res Judicata and Collateral
Estoppel.

These defenses were based upon the fact that the

Utah Supreme Court, in case No. 14776, had previously decided
the same issues and resolved the same requests for relief
between the plaintiff-respondent Kennecott Copper Corporation
and defendant-appellant Salt Lake County.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-7-

Plaintiff-respondent Kennecott Copper Corporation
thereafter moved alternatively for judgment on the pleadings
or for summary judgment with regard to its First Cause of
Action. (T-25-28)
Defendant-appellant Salt Lake County moved
alternatively for judgment on the pleadings or for sununary
judgment with regard to the First and Second Causes of
Action by the plaintiff. (T-33-48)
Defendant-appellant's motions were denied. (T-49)
Plaintiff- respondent's motion was taken under
advisement with each party supplying the Court with legal
memoranda. (T-50-62) and T-63-72)
On April 4, 1977, the Court issued its Memorandum
Decision granting plaintiff-respondent's motion for summary
judgment. (T-73-76)
appealed. (T-85)

Defendant-appellant Salt Lake County

In its Memorandum Decision, the Court

reasoned and found as follows:
"In this case the Court finds that Salt Lake
County, on August 9 1976, set the Mill Levy
for taxation at 14.42 mills. Thereafter, on
September 20, 1976, the County by a new resolution changed the Mill Levy to 16 mills.
The issue to be decided by the Court is
whether or not the imposition of a mill levy of
16 mills, voted upon by the Salt Lake County
Commission September 20, 1976, is lawful.
Utah Code Annotated 59-9-6.3 requires the
Board of County Commissioners of each County
in the State of Utah levying an ad valorem
property tax to fix the mill levy between the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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dates of the last Monday of July of each
year, and the second Monday of August of
each year. The applicable provision of
59-9-6.3 reads as follows:
'The Board of County Commissioners of each
County must levy a tax on the taxable property
of the County between the last Monday in the
seventh month of each fiscal year, and the
second Monday in the eighth month of each
fiscal year, to provide funds for County
purposes ••• '
The provision of 17-36-1 of the Utah Code
Annotated also provides:
'On or before the second Monday in August
of each year, the governing body shall levy
a tax on the taxable real and personal property
in the County ••. '
In addition to the Sections already cited,
the Court calls attantion to 59-9-8 which
provides for:
'The governing body of each city and town,
and the said Board of County Commissioners,
must file a statement with the State Tax
Commission, on or before the second Monday in
August of each year, showing the amount and
the purpose of each levy fixed by such governing
body and Board.'
The Court finds that the words 'must' and
'shall' as set forth in the 59-9-6.3 and 17-36-1
are mandatory and not merely directory.
Black's Law Dictionary in referring to the
word 'must' says:
'This word, like the word 'shall', is
primarily a mandatory affect ••• '
An examination of the same word in 'Words and
Phrases' shows that generally speaking the use
of the word 'must' is mandatory, not merely
directory.
In view of the provisions of 59-9-8 it seems
that the Utah Legislature has consistently held
to the levy being fixed by the second Monday in
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August of each year. That
been in the Code since the
Section 59-9-6.3 was added
and merely carries out the

provision has
laws of 1923.
to the law in 1961,
legislative intent.

Defendants refer the Court to 59-11-7 which
reads:
'No assessment, or act relating to
assessment, or collection of taxes, is illegal
on account of inofrmality, or because the
same was not completed within the time required
by law.'
The Court finds that there is a distinction
between the assessment and the levy of the
tax. McQuillin on Municipal Cornoration,
Section 44.92 states:
'Levy and assessment are distinct processes,
and, except wher·e otherwise provided by
Statute, both are essential to taxation.'
The Code citation above referred to relates
to the 'assessment', whereas the first citations refer to the 'levy' of the tax.
McQuillin on Municinal Corporations, Section
44.93 says: 'Whatever preliminaries are by
law made essential and mandatory, as
distinguished from directory merely, to the
levy of a tax, must be observed or the tax
will be void.'
The same authority at Section 44.95 states
as follows: 'The time for making the levy is,
in most jurisdictions, prescribed by statute
or charter. Unless such provision is directory
merely, the taxing authorities may not disregard
a definite provision as to the time for the
making of the levy, or as to when the amount
of the tax is to be determined and certified.
Generally, only one levy a year is authorized
for the same purpose; but where no time is
fixed for the levy the ordinance may be passed
at any time'within the year.'
'The applicable law governs
effective date of a levy, and
covered thereby. It has been
municipality is authorized to

as to the
as to the period
held that a
levy taxes in
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anticipation of demands that will arise in the
future.
A levy of taxes by a city during the
year of its incorporation generally is authorized.'
The Court recognizes the general rule on
statutory construction of revenue legislation
as set forth in Sutherland on Statutes and
Statutory Construction, Section 6701.
General
Rule. 'While the power to tax, and the exercise
of that power is indispensable to the effective
operation of government, the rule has become
firmly established that tax laws are to be
strictly construed against the state and in
favor of the taxpayer.
Therefore, where there
is reasonable doubt as to the meaning of a revenue
statute it should be resolved in favor of
those taxed.'
For the foregoing reasons the Court grants
the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment,
and directs the plaintiff to prepare an
appropriate order."
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
DEFENDANTtS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON
THE PLEADINGS OR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BECAUSE THE ISSUES RAISED BY PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT HAVE PREVIOUSLY BEEN DECIDED
BY THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH AS AGAINST
PLAINTIFF AND IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT.
In denying defendant's motions, the trial court
completely ignored the fact that the same parties to this
action had already litigated the same issues in the Utah
Supreme Court.

In so doing, the trial court failed to

recognize the rule of res judicata by which a final judgment
or decree on the merits is conclusive as to all points and
matters determined in a former suit.

The fact that the

first action was initiated and decided in the Supreme Court
does not alter the effect of the former adjudication.
"The doctrine of res judicata applies as
well to judgments of courts of last resort as
to those of nisi prius courts; and a decision
of an appellate court will preclude any further
action on the same matter between the parties,
provided the court acts within its jurisdiction."
50 C.J.S. Judgments, Section 607 p. 30.
Nor does the fact that plaintiff-respondent's
first action in the Supreme Court involved extraordinary
relief alter the effect:
"It is well settled that the doctrine of
res judicata is applicable to judgments
in mandamus and prohibition proceedings,
that is, the special character of these
proceedings does not ipso facto, preclude
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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contain errors.
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a judgment rendered therein from operating
as res judicata in another action or
proceedings." 21 A. L. R. 3d, MandamusProhibition-Res Judicata Section 2 at
p. 213.
The effect of the former adjudication involving the
same issues, whether raised in an action for extraordinary
relief or otherwise is, therefore, conclusive.
"Many cases have dealt with the question as
to the conclusive effect of a judgment in a
mandamus or prohibition proceeding on issues
raised in another action.
As to issues
actually determined by the judgment in the
mandamus or prohibition proceeding, the judgment is conclusive, thus precluding the parties
from relitigating the same issues." 21 A.L.R.
3d 206, Section 2 at p. 214.
In its first lawsuit in the Supreme Court, Kennecott
asserted that the defendant Salt Lake County was not complying
with the Court's decision in Salt Lake City Corporation et al.
v. Salt Lake County, et al., 550 P2d 1291 (Utah 1976) and
Section 17-34, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and sought
prohibition against Salt Lake County.

In its second action

in the District Court, Kennecott asserted that the defendant
Salt Lake County was not complying with the Court's decision
in Salt Lake City Corporation et al v. Salt Lake County et al.,
550 P2d 1291 (Utah 1976) and Section 17-34, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended, and sought a refund for taxes paid under
protest.
In its first lawsuit in the Supreme Court of Utah,
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plaintiff Kennecott alleged that the Salt Lake County mill
levy for 1976 was illegal as being statutorily untimely and
too late and sought prohibition of the subsequent levy.

In

the second lawsuit, plaintiff sought a refund for the excess
between the mill levy initially adopted and the one subsequently
adopted on the grounds it was statutorily untimely.
Plaintiff's petition in the Supreme Court was denied
as to both claims.

Justice Henroid filed a written dissent

from the majority opinion.

Justice Crockett voted to deny

plaintiff's petition on other grounds.
The issues disposed of by the Supreme Court in the
first lawsuit are the same as the ones presented in the
second lawsuit filed by Kennecott.
It is, therefore, submitted that under the doctrine
of res judicata the issues determined in the former action
are conclusively settled by the judgment of the Supreme Court
and may not again be relitigated in the second action between
Kennecott and Salt Lake County and that the trial judge erred
in denying the defendant's alternative motions.

See 21 A.L.R.

305, Mandamus-Prohibition-Res Judicata, Section 9(b) p. 232.
See also Restatement of Judgments, Section 48 and Tentative
Draft No. 4 Restatement of the Law Second, Judgments, April 15,
1977.
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J1

POINT II
THE ACTION OF SALT LAKE COUNTY IN RE-SETTING
THE MILL LEVY AS FINALLY ADOPTED DID NOT
NULLIFY THE LEVY AND THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT IN SO RULING WAS ERRONEOUS.
County tax levies are covered by Sections 59-9-6.1
through 59-9-6.5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 1961.
Sections 59-9-6.1 sets out the legislative purpose
for enacting the sections of the Code dealing with County levies.
"Since it is difficult to provide a break
down of mill levies for specific purposes
on a state-wide basis due to the varying
needs of individual counties, it is adviseable and in the best interest of good county
government that an over-all levy be provided
for. This will allow the county legislative
body to use county funds where needed and to
improve budgetary procedures in accordance
with the uniform accounting system passed
by the 1957 legislature. It is the purpose
of this bill to provide a maximum over-all
mill levy for counties accordin to assessed
value."
emphasis supplied
The purposes of this legislative scheme are three fold:
(a) to allow county legislative bodies to use county
funds where needed;
(b) improve budgetary procedures in accordance with
the uniform accounting system; and
(c) provide a maximum over-all mill levy for counties
according to assessed value.
Section 59-9-6.2 implements in part the legislative
purpose by setting the maximum mill levy.

Sixteen mills are

allowed for counties with a total assessed value of more than
$20,000,000 and eighteen mills for counties with a total assessed
value of less than $20,000,000.

That Salt Lake County is entitled

to levy 16 mills is not disputed by either plaintiff or defendant.
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Section 59-9-6.3 provides that:
"The Board of County Commissioners of each
county must levy a tax on the taxable property
of the county between the last Monday in the
seventh month of each fiscal year and second
Monday of the eighth month of each fiscal year
to provide funds for county purposes .... "
(emphasis supplied)
Section 59-9-6.4 constitutes a recognition on the
part of the legislature that the County Commissions are the
proper bodies to "determine the amount" available for each
purpose authorized by law.

(emphasis supplied)

Section 59-9-8 requires that the governing body of
each city and town, and each board of County Commissioners,
"must file a statement with the State Tax Commission, on or
before the second Monday in August of each year, showing the
amount and purpose of each levy .... "
Section 59-9-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
imposes a statutory duty upon the State Tax Commission to
" .•. carefully examine such statements, and, if it appears that
any levy has been fixed in excess of the maximum amount permitte
by law, it shall immediately notify the county attorney of the
county in which it appears that such excess has been fixed."
(emphasis supplied)
A careful reading of Sections 59-9-6.3, 59-9-8 and

59-9-9 will demonstrate that the three statutes were enacted to
insure compliance with the maximum mill levy limitations of
Sections 59-9-6.2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, while still

le"~

the authority to set the levy to the county boards.
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There is no indication in the statutes that the
legislature intended a levy to be void because it was not set
within the time set out in the statutes.

To the contrary,

Section 59-9-9 and Section 59-9-10, Utah Code Annotated, contemplate that a correct levy be set and enforced after the
time prescribed in Section 59-9-6.3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
If the legislature had wanted to nullify the levy because of
imposition after the time prescribed in Section 59-9-6.3, they
would have included such a provision.

If the time element had

been viewed as critical by the legislature, they would not have
passed a statute that of necessity contemplates a setting of
the final correct levy after the time prescribed in the statute.
It is respectfully submitted that the ruling of the
trial court fails to give recognition to the intent on the legislature with regard to the setting of a correct mill levy and
is therefore erroneous and should be reversed.

POINT III
THE WORD "MUST" HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY HELD TO
BE DIRECTORY RATHER THAN MANDATORY BY THE
UTAH SUPREME COURT WHEN APPLIED TO TIME LIMITS
INVOLVING PUBLIC AND GOVERNMENTAL BODIES.
An analysis of the several cases decided by the Utah
Supreme Court will demonstrate that the Court has viewed words
such as "must" and "shall" as directory rather than mandatory
when dealing with public bodies.
Our Supreme Court has further indicated that the
Courts should not interfere with actions of County Commissions
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except in extreme circumstances.

In Cottonwood City Electo.£§.

v. Salt Lake County Board of Commissioners, 499 P.2d 270 (197 2:
the

Supreme Court was called upon to review rejection by the

Salt Lake County Commission of a petition to incorporate a town
to be known as Cottonwood City.

In addressing the legality or

the Commission's refusal to act upon the petition of the residents of the area, our Court first indicated how questions
involving the County and its governing body should be approached
Justice Crockett, speaking for a unanimous Court made the follow.
ing significant observation:
" ... it is appropriate to have in mind certain
foundational propositions relating to the
County and its governing body the County
Commission. The County is a political subdivision of the State whose creation and
whose powers and duties are derived from
the constitution and statutory law.
It is
the function of the County Cornrnission~o
govern the County as to best provide for its
general welfare and good order, and to carry
on the various activities and provide the
public services usually considered to be the
responsibility of county government.
It has
such powers as are specifically enunciated
by law and those that are reasonably and
necessarily implied in order to discharge
those responsibilities.
In connection therewith it acts as the legislative body for the
County, and also in various of its duties
acts as the executive in administering county
affairs.
In order to discharge those responsibilities in an efficient and appropriate
manner it must necessarily be allowed a
reasonable latitude of discretion." 499 P.2d
at pages 271 & 272.
(emphasis supplied)
And as was further stated by Justice Crockett in the same
case:
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" ... the courts should not interfere with the
actions of the Commission unless it appears
that it acted beyond its authority, or in
some manner which is clearly contrary to law,
or so without basis in reason that its
action must be deemed capricious and arbitrar
emphasis supplied.

II

With the foregoing standards in mind, the Court's
attention is now directed towards the Utah cases dealing with
the effect of time limits contained within certain statutes and
how the Utah Supreme Court has applied the standards.
An early case to come before the Utah Supreme Court
was Tanner v. Nelson, 70 Pac. 984 (1902).

The case arose when

the state superintendent of public instruction gave the required
statutory notice that the superintendent of public instruction,
the principal of the state normal school and county superintendents would hold a convention at Salt Lake City for the purpose
of adopting textbooks for use in the district schools of the
state.

The statute in question provided that "the convention

shall meet and publicly open and read the proposals" for textbooks.

It was contended by the appellant that the provision

referred to above was directory and that substantial compliance
was sufficient.

The respondent argued that the statute was

mandatory, and that the failure to read the bids as opened was
fatal to the proceedings.

In analyzing the statute in light of

the parties' contentions, the Court observed as follows:
"The statutory provisions which may thus be
departed from with impunity without affecting
the validity of the statutory proceedings are
usually those which relate to the mode or
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time of doing that which is essential to
effect the aim and purpose of the legislature,
or some incident of the essential act."
"Where the provision is in affirmative words,
and there are no negative words, and relates
to the time or manner of doing the acts which
constitute the chief purpose of the law, or
those incidental or subsidiary thereto, by an
official person, the provision has been usually
treated as directory.
(emphasis supplied)
70 Pac. 984 at page 987.
The Court then went on to uphold the actions of the public
officials as being in substantial compliance with the purposes
of the act.

In reaching its decision the Court observed the

following significant quotations:
"When the statute directs an act to be done in
a certain way at a certain time, and a direct
compliance as to time and form does not appear
to the judicial mind to be essential, the
proceedings are held valid, though the command
by the statute has been disregarded.
The
statute in such a case is said to be directory."
"Irregularities in official action, consisting
in the neglect or lack of strict compliance
with statutory directions, should not be
allowed to vitiate the proceedings taken under
a statute, when the objects and ends of the
statute have been substantially accomplished,
and neither public nor private persons are
injured by the course of proceedings."
In the case of Wright v. Park City School District,
133 Pac. 128 (1913), the Utah Supreme Court was reviewing an
action brought to prohibit Park City School District from
proceeding to levy a tax to maintain a high school separate
and apart from the other school districts of Summit County.
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The action claimed that the separate school could not be
established because the board did not proceed within the sixty
day statutory period.

No action had been taken until about

nine months after the act in question became law.

The two

statutory provisions involved provided as follows:
Section 2:

ttWithin 60 days after the approval of this act
each county superintendent of district schools
shall report to the board of county commissioners
as to whether or not, in his opinion, the county
should remain one high school district."

Section 3:

"Upon receipt of such report and recommendations
the board of county commissioners shall set a day
for hearing the same, which shall be not less
than thirty days nor more tha~ sixty days from
the day of setting .... "
Plaintiff contended that the sixty day provisions were

mandatory.

Defendants argued the provisions were directory and

that substantial compliance was sufficient.
language to be directory.

The Court held the

The Court, in reaching its decision,

made the following significant statements:
"The general rule is that a statute, prescribing the time within which public
officers are required to perform an official
act, is directory only, unless it contains
negative words denying the exercise of the
power after the time specified or the nature
of the act to be performed, or the language
used by the Legislature shows that the designation of time was intended as a limitation."
The Court went on to cite Sutherland's treatise on Statutory
Construction and adopted the following quotation:
"Provisions regulating the duties of public
officers and specifying the time for their
performance are, in that regard, generally
directory. Though a statute directs a thing
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to be done at a particular time, it does not
necessarily follow that it may not be done
afterwards."
"Statutes directing the mode of proceeding
by public officers are directory, and are
not to be regarded as essential to the
validity of the proceedings themselves,
unless so declared in the statutes."
Finally, the Court observed:

"There is nothing in the natun

of the duty to be performed either by the county school superintendent or the board of county commissioners, under the
statute in question that justifies the inference that the
Legislature intended that if it were not performed within the
time specified it should not be performed at all."

In the

instant case there is no indication that the legislature

intem~

that no levy be set by the County if not done so by the second
Monday in the eighth month of each fiscal year.

The initial

14.42 mill levy had been approved by the County Commission,
certified to the Salt Lake County Auditor, approved by the

Sta~

Tax Commission, but not reported to the Salt Lake County
Treasurer.

Thus, the mill levy process on the 14.42 mills had

not been completed when the County Commission, realizing its
mistake, increased the mill levy with the approval of the Tax
Commission to 16 mills as allowed by law and thereby attempting i
to avoid violating Article XIV, Sections 3 and 4 of the Constitution of Utah, which prohibits the County from incurring debt
in excess of expected tax receipts for the current year.
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In Hablin v. State Board of Land, 187 P.178 (1919),
the Utah Supreme Court was asked to interpret whether the word
"must" in a statute requiring that an application for preference
right to purchase school land within ninety days was mandatory
or directory.

The plaintiff had failed to file an application

within ninety days after the survey plats had been filed in the
United States Land Office.

The State Board of Land claimed it

could not grant the application because more than ninety days
had elapsed since the filing of the plat.

The Utah Supreme

Court determined that the Board had the power to grant the
application and issue a certificate of sale notwithstanding
more than ninety days had elapsed because the word "must" as
used in the statute was directory.
Plaintiff-respondent, in its argument in the trial
court cited the case of Glen v. Ferrell, 5 Utah 2d 439, 304 P.2d
380 (1956), as authority for the proposition that the word "must"
is mandatory rather than directory.

However, plaintiff-

responsdent fails to recognize the factual differences presented
in that case.

That case involved an attempt to attach personal

property of a non-resident located in the State of Utah.

The

Utah attachment statute required that shares of a corporation
"must be attached by leaving with the president, secretary,
cashier or other managing agent thereof, a copy of the writ,
and a notice stating that the stock or interest of defendant
is attached .... "

The plaintiff failed to serve an officer of
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the company as required by the rule.

The Court held the

statutory procedure to be mandatory and found no compelling
reason to view the word "must" as directory.
readily distinguishable on several grounds.

The case is
First, the

attachment was used as a basis for acquiring jurisdiction and
the courts have been reluctant to over-look irregularities
when extraordinary writs or proceedings are involved.

In the

instant case there is no jurisdictional problem present.

The

statute does not prohibit the Commission from setting the levy
if the time limit has not been met.

In Ferrell, plaintiff was

an individual claiming against another individual.

In the

instant case as in the three previous cases cited herein,
defendant is a governmental entity.

The Court is required to

take a more restrained approach when dealing with the powers of
such governmental entities.
in Cottonwood case.

See discussion by Justice Crockett

The cases previously cited and relied upoo

by defendant all relate to time deadlines and governmental
authority to act beyond such a deadline.
involves the same problem.

The instant case

In Ferrell, there was no time

element involved but merely the manner in which plaintiff had
proceeded.

Defendant-appellant would submit that the case of

Glen v. Ferrell, supra, is therefore not in point.

The most

recent Utah Supreme Court decision involving time limits for
public bodies to act clearly demonstrates that Wright v. Park
City, supra, is still controlling in the State of Utah.
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Sjostrom v. Bishop, 15 Utah 2d 373, 393 P.2d 472 (1964) involved
the failure of an elected public official to timely file with
the city recorder and publish in a daily newspaper, a sworn
statement of campaign expenses.

The statute in question pro-

vided, in part, as fo~lows:
"Every elective officer in a city of the
first and second class shall within thirty
days after qualifying file with the city
recorder and publish .... "
The Utah Supreme Court was required to determine whether the
time limit was mandatory or directory.

In determining the

language to be directory, the Court set forth the guidelines
to be followed in making such a determination.

"The most

fundamental one is that the court should give effect to the
intention of the legislature."

In the instant case, the legi-

slative intent was to set and insure compliance with a maximum
mill levy limitation.

That intent has not been frustrated by

the defendant-appellant's actions herein.

Next, "the court

must analyze the statute in the light of its history and background; the purpose it was designed to accomplish; and what
interpretation and application will best serve that purpose in
practical operation."

In the instant case the history and

background of the statutes involved indicate that the statutes
in question were passed to provide for an over-all levy.

Its

purpose was further to allow county legislative bodies to utilize
county funds where needed and improve budgetary procedures in
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accordance with the uniform accounting system passed by the
1957 legislature, and finally, to provide a maximum over-a11
mill levy according to assessed valuation.

None of the fore-

going purposes would be frustrated by this Court's determination that the re-setting of the levy was proper.

On the

contrary, if this Court were to adopt the position of the
plaintiff Kennecott, the intent of the legislature would be
frustrated because it would impede the ability of the county
legislative body i.e., the county commission, to use funds
where needed.
levy 16 mills.

Salt Lake County has the statutory right to
It has the duty to meet the needs of its

citizens, individuals and corporate alike.

constit~

It has the

tional duty to expend only such amounts as can be anticipated
as revenues.

To adopt plaintiff's position would not only

ignore these rights, duties and responsibilities, but do
questi~.

violence to the legislative purpose of the statutes in
Salt Lake County has the power to levy taxes.
to set and adopt a mill levy.

It has the power

It must therefore follow that

it has the power to re-set and re-adopt a mill levy.
17-4-1 and 17-4-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

See

See also

Cottonwood City Electors v. Salt Lake County Board of Commissioners, supra, at pages 271 and 272.
Further, in the instant case the 16 mills were
approved by the State Tax Commission of Utah.

As was stated by

the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Baker v. Tax Commission,
520 P.2d 203 (1974):
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"Since the commission has general supervision
over the tax laws of the state and over those
charged with the enforcement of the laws, and
has the power on appeal to make such correction
or change in the order of the county board of
equalization as it may deem proper, it must
necessarily follow that its authority to cancel,
vacate or change an assessment when, upon a
proper showing, it has been determined that
the assessment should be so cancelled, vacated
or changed .... "
In the same case when the Supreme Court reviewed the
powers of the County Commission sitting as a board of equalization it cited the following quote with approval:
"Power of a county board of taxation to
"revise and correct assessment in accordance
with the true value of the taxable property"
necessarily includes the right to cancel the
assessment entirely where the property is
determined to be not taxable .... "
520 P.2d 203 at page 206.
The foregoing decision is a clear indication of how
extensive the powers of the Tax Commission and County Commission
are with respect to the assessment and collection of taxes.

The

Tax Commission had the authority to approve the increased mill
levy in the instant case.

It exercised that authority.

In

addition, the Supreme Court in the Baker case, when confronted
with the contention that the Commission lost jurisdiction to
hear matters after the statutory deadline made the following
observation:
"There is no merit to the contention that
the Commission lost jurisdiction simply
because these appeals from the ruling of
the Board were not taken within five days
after June 20, when those rulings were not
even made until September 15."
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It is respectfully submitted that the Tax Commission had the
authority to approve the re-set mill levy after the time prescribed in Section 59-9-6.3 and that its action in approving
the increased levy, so long as within the maximum allowed by
statute, should be sustained by this Court.
POINT IV
THE ACTION OF SALT LAKE COUNTY IS FURTHER
VALIDATED BY THE CURATIVE EFFECT OF
SECTION 59-11-7, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953,
AS AMENDED.
Section 59-11-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended provides as follows:
"No assessment or act relating to assessment or collection of taxes is illegal on
account of informality or because the same
was not corn leted within the time re uired
by law."
emphasis supplied
Plaintiff-respondent argued that the instant case is
not covered by the foregoing curative statute because they are
only attacking the levy made by Salt Lake County.
court agreed.

The trial

Defendant-appellant would submit that plaintiff':

argument in this regard is totally without merit and the ruling
of the trial court is not supported by the authorities.

To

say that the levy is not an act related to the assessment or
collection of taxes is to completely disregard the general
accepted meaning of that term.

"To "levy" a tax means to raise

or collect a tax - to impose or assess a tax, and collect it
under authority of law.

"Levy" is the legislative act, whether
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state or local, which determines that a tax should be laid.
It is the first essential to a valid tax of any description."
72 Arn Jur 2d §704.

In short, the levy is the tax that is

assessed or charged against the property.

"The word "levy"

as applied to taxation, is given a variety of meanings.
Strictly speaking, a levy is the legislative act, whether state
or local, which determines that a tax shall be laid, and fixes
its amount, and this is the meaning of the term as used in this
chapter."

§1012 Cooley on Taxation.
"Levying a tax usually means the fixing of the rate

at which property is to be taxed."
See also Black's Law Dictionary.

Emeric v. Alvarado, 2 P.418.
Assessment on the other hand

embraces more than simply the amount.

"It includes the procedure

on the part of the officials by which the property is listed,
valued, and finally the proportion declared.

It is said to

include the whole statutory mode of imposing the tax, and
embraces all the.proceedings for raising money by the exercise
of the power of taxation from the inception to the conclusion
of proceedings."

72 Arn Jur 2d §704.

To say that the levy is

not an act relating to the assessment or collection of taxes
is like saying that the human body includes only the head and
legs, but nothing between.

It is respectfully submitted that

the action taken by Salt Lake County in adopting a mill levy
within the limits set by law was a valid act within the broad
powers granted to such bodies.

That substantial compliance
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with the time period set for adopting the levy is sufficient
to constitute a valid levy within the meaning of the decisiom
of the Utah Supreme Court relating to the time within which
public bodies must act; and, finally, that the curative statute
enacted by the Legislature is sufficient to avoid any

technic~

defect that might have occurred because of the adoption of

t~

mill levy shortly after the statutory time had passed.
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the tria;
court failed to consider the intent of the legislature and
the plain meaning and purposes of Section 59-11-7, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended, when it granted plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment and should therefore be reversed.
CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit to this Honorable Court
that the trial court erred, that under the facts and circumstances of this case and the law applicable thereto, the mill
levy adopted by Salt Lake County for the year 1976, although
re-set after the time specified by statute, was still a valid
mill levy.

That the assessments made during 1976 based upon

said mill levy are valid.

That the issues presented in the

second action filed by plaintiff, Kennecott, were previously
adjudicated by this Court and therefore should not have been
re-litigated.

That the decision of the trial court is

contrary to law and not in accordance with previous decision
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of this Court and should be reversed and judgment be entered
for the defendant-appellant.
Respectfully submitted,
R. PAUL VAN DAM
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY

BILL THOMAS PETERS
SPECIAL DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY
220 South 200 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for defendant-appellant
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